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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Hanafi School of Muslim Law l recognized by most Pakistanis, stipulates that a 
divorced mother's right to the care and custody of her children outweighs the father's 
claims until the girls reach puberty and the boys reach age seven. The father's right to 
custody arises thereafter, though the father retains legal, if not actual, custody through-
out the children's minority.2 More often than not, custody decisions entered by the 
Pakistani courts deviate from these rules. Jurists cite the custody provisions of the 
Guardians & Wards Act of 1890 to mask their reliance on a "best interests of the child" 
standard similar to the test found in British family law. 3 The legal technique by which 
courts incorporate the "best interests" test into the Pakistani rule of decision is the ancient 
concept of "ijtihad" or "the exercise of human reason to ascertain a rule of [Muslim] law."4 
* A.B. Harvard College; B.A. Trinity College, Oxford University; ].D. University of Chicago. I 
wish to thank David Pellman for valuable suggestions and assistance. Professor Fazlur Rahman, 
University of Chicago, also offered comments on a preliminary draft of this article. 
I Abii-Hanifa (d. 767) was a leading authority on the law of Kiifa, an early Islamic province. 
After his death, the school of Kiifa became the Hanafi school, "for the faithful pupil ash-Shaybani 
attributed the authority for all his writings to his former master Abii-Hanifa." N. COULSON, A 
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 51 (1964). The Hanafi school, which was the official school of the Ottoman 
and Moghal empires, predominates in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. Esposito, 
Perspectives in Islamic Law Reform, 13 N.Y.U.]. INT'L L. & POL. 217, 219 (1980). Other schools of law 
are the Maliki, Shan, and Hanbali schools. N. COULSON, supra, at 51, 71. 
2 Legal custody is the judicially enforceable right to custody. It includes ultimate legal responsi-
bility for the child's welfare. Actual custody is physical custody. A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN 
LAW 189 (1964) (citing Tyabji § 235 and Mulla § 352). 
3 See S(BD) v. S(ID) (1977) 1 All E.R. 656; J v. C 1970 A.C. 668. See generally]. GOLDSTEIN, A. 
FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (2d ed. 1981). 
4 N. COULSON, supra note 1, at 237. Ijtihad is one of the four classic sources of Islamic law. The 
most important is the Qur'an itself. The second is the sunna, or the Prophet'S deeds as recorded 
outside the Qur'an. The third source, ijma', denotes consensus of opinion. The final source is ijtihad 
al qiyas or reason by analogy. Bonderman, Modernization and Changing Perceptions of Islamic Law, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (1968). Several forms of ijtihad contributed to the development ofIslamic 
law. Two important types are istihsan or juristic preference, and istislah or public interest. These 
were used to achieve equity when qiyas (strict analogical reasoning) led to unnecessarily harsh results. 
Esposito, supra note 1, at 241. According to Joseph Schacht, during "the first two and a half centuries 
of Islam ... there was never any question of denying to any scholar or specialist of the sacred Law 
[shari'a] the right to find his own solution to legal problems."]' SCHACHT, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC 
LAW 70 (1964), quoted in C. SMITH, ISLAM AND THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL ORDER IN MODERN EGYPT 233 
(1983). The scope of ijtihad narrowed considerably as the law became codified, until it could be 
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Pakistani judges relying on ijtihad have drawn the lines for a debate which is central 
to the role of law within the Islamic state. Ijtihad is a technique of change. 5 In a world 
where Muslim family law is strained and pulled by current events, and "western" views of 
accepted behavior are exported wholesale to Moslem consumers,6 a mechanism for 
evolution is a safety valve. But change is difficult to recGlncile with a Qur'anic state. Ijtihad 
may represent innovative legal reasoning which would strengthen Islam in Pakistan, but 
to prove their case, jurists advocating ijtihad must argue that it is unremarkable - that it 
has always been an organic part of Muslim law, ready to be exercised in just such a way. In 
the context of Pakistani child custody and Anglo-Muhammadan law, this position is 
entirely tenable. 
The legislative enactments and court decisions which attempt to define, interpret, or 
limit Muslim law in Pakistan and India are termed Anglo-Muhammadan law. 7 According 
to Coulson, Anglo-Muhammadan law is 
an expression of Islamic law unique not only in form - for it is genuinely 
applied as a case-law system through a hierarchy of courts which observes the 
doctrine of binding precedent - but also in substance, inasmuch as it has 
absorbed English influences, particularly those of equity.s 
The major part of Anglo-Muhammadan law was assimilated into Pakistani law through 
article 224 of the 1956 Pakistan Constitution, which provided for the incorporation of 
pre-existing law "save as is otherwise expressly provided in the Constitution" and "so far 
as is applicable and with necessary modifications."9 
The Guardians & Wards Act of 1890 was enacted at a time of pervasive British 
influence in what is now Pakistan. The early British practice of applying Islamic law to 
Muslims in matters governed by the personal law of the Qur'an had been effectively 
abandoned. 10 The Pakistan Penal Code of 1860 severely limited the operation of Muslim 
religious and customary law, as did the Divorce Act of 1869. The Punjab Laws Act IV of 
1872 reinforced the secondary role of Muslim law as a rule of decision by calling for 
judicial reliance on, first, custom which was not contrary to justice or good conscience and 
not void or overridden by other enactments, and second, Muhammadan law to the extent 
that it had not been legislatively abolished or alteredY Muslim personal law was generally 
exercised only with reference to the hadiths (the narratives relating to the Prophet), qlyas or 
deductive analogy, and the consensus of the legal community, ijma. SMITH, supra at 233. 
5 See generally Rahman,lslamic Modernism, INT'LJ. MIDDLE EAST 317 (1970); TANZIL-UR-RAHMAN, 
ISLAMIZATION OF PAKISTAN LAW (1978). 
6 Rahman, supra at 319 passim. 
7 N. COULSON, supra note 1, at 171-72. 
8 [d. at 171. 
9 PAK. CONST. of 1956 art. 224. Though the 1956 constitution was abrogated in 1958, later 
constitutions have contained similar provisions. See, e.g., PAK. CONST. of 1973 art. 268. 
10 The Mufassal Regulation of 1772 provid~d that: 
in all suits regarding inheritance, marriage and caste, and other \'e1igious usages and 
institutions, the laws of the Koran with respect to Mahomedans, and those of the 
Shaster with respect to Gentoos, and where only one of the parties shall be a Mahome-
dan or Gentoo, the laws and usages of the defendant shall invariably be adhered to. 
Quoted in A. GLEDHILL, PAKISTAN: THE DEVELOPME"T OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION 278 (1967). By 
1827, the Bombay Regulation IV placed customary law above Muslim law as a rule of decision. See 
discussion in R. PATEL, WOMEN AND LAW IN PAKISTAN 4-5 (1979). 
11 PAKISTAN CODE, Vol. II, 73-74. 
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overridden by capricious application of equitable principles in cases reaching the courts, 12 
and by legislation preempting entire categories of Muslim law. 
II. THE GUARDIANS & WARDS ACT OF 1890 
Though the Guardians & Wards Act sets out the framework for court consideration 
of custody disputes, only section 25(1) explicitly concerns custody. It states that "[i]f a 
ward leaves or is removed from the custody of a guardian of his person, the Court, if it is 
of the opinion that it will be for the welfare of the ward to return to the custody of his 
guardian, may make an order for his return."13 On its face, this merely allows for the 
possibility of court intervention to reestablish the original arrangement. But since both 
divorced parents may retain a form of custody - the mother exercises actual custody 
while the father relies on legal custody - the provision has been applied to transfer 
custody from one parent to the other when "it will be for the welfare of the ward."14 In 
other words, the courts may disregard Hanafi custodial hierarchy. 
The scope of a court's section 25( 1) power to adjust custody awards is bounded by the 
somewhat confusing statutory definition of "guardian." According to section 4(2) of the 
Guardians & Wards Act, a guardian is "a person having the care of the person of a minor, 
or of his property, or of both his person and property."15 A guardian may have actual or 
legal care of the person of a minor,16 and "in this sense even a mother who has only the 
custody of the child is its guardian."17 If, then, the children of a marriage live with their 
mother after the divorce, the mother will have actual custody and care, and the father will 
have constructive custody and care. A form of guardianship and custody will reside with 
each parent. If, however, the father retains custody after divorce, he will hold all the 
rights of guardianship since he is the "legal and natural guardian" of his minor children 
under the Majority Act (IX of 1875).18 If the children are within the ages when Hanafi law 
gives custody to the mother, it may be argued that she retains constructive custody and 
can rely on section 25(1) if she wishes to be reunited with her children. Otherwise, she 
must rely on other provisions of the Act. 
Section 19(b) is one such possibility. It states that a court may not intervene to appoint 
a guardian for a minor "whose father is living and is not, in the opinion of the court, unfit 
to be guardian of the person of the minor." If the father is found to be unfit,19 the mother 
can apply for guardianship, but the court may make an appointment only "where the 
court is satisfied that it is for the welfare of a minor that an order should be made."20 
12 Lord Hobhouse in Waghela v. Masludin, 14 INDIAN App. 89, 96 (1887), admitted that "in 
point of fact, the matter must be decided by equity and good conscience, generally interpreted to 
mean the rules of English law if found applicable to Indian society and circumstances," cited in A. 
FYZEE, supra note 2, at 55. 
13 The Guardians & Wards Act of 1890, § 2fi(I). 
14 M. MOKAL, THE GUARDIANS & WARDS ACT (VII OF 1890) AND THE MAJORITY ACT (IX OF 1875) 
WITH COMMENTARY 17 (1979). Compare Re S 1977 Fam. 173; S(BD) v. S(ID) (1977) 1 All E.R. 656. 
15 The custodial disputes discussed in this essay are exclusively disputes over the person. 
16 M. MOKAL, supra note 14, at 16. 
17 Niaz Bi v. Fazal Iiahi, P.L.D. Lah. 442 (1953). 
18 The Majority Act of 1875, § 2(a). See M. MOKAL, supra note 14, at 446. 
19 A father will be found unfit if he has deserted the family, exhibited bad character, or applied 
the minor's property to his own use. F. TYABJI, MUSLIM LAW § 25b (4th ed. 1968). Factors such as 
harshness, bad temper, intemperance or remarriag.e are relevant but not decisive. Id. 
20 The Guardians & Wards Act of 1890, § 7. 
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Factors to be considered include "the age, sex and religion of the minor, the character and 
capacity of the proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes, if any, 
of a deceased parent, and any existing or previous relations of the proposed guardian 
with the minor or his property." Further, "[i]f the minor is old enough to form an 
intelligent preference, the Court may consider that preference."~l 
In summary, section 25(1) of the Guardians & Wards Act of 1890 empowers the 
courts to decide simple custody disputes between parents according to the minor's 
welfare. If one of the parents has been declared unfit or has lost custodial rights for some 
other reason/~ section 19(b) enables a court order in the child's welfare. The court shall 
be guided by the law to which the minor is subject, and shall consider the statutory factors 
listed above. When the minor's father is living and has not been declared unfit, the court 
may not appoint a guardian, but may apparently give mere custody to another person. 
III. DECISIONS UNDER THE GUARDIANS & WARDS ACT OF 1890 
Courts confronting this cobweb of rules have, since 1964, generally relied on a 
"welfare" test for determining custody under all circumstances. Prior to 1964, the place of 
Muslim personal law in the Act's scheme was problematic. Only section 17(1) requires that 
Muslim law be considered, and then only when it is clear that the minor's welfare requires 
a guardianship order arising under that particular section. In contrast, the Punjab 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (IX of 1948) provided that for custody 
decisions and other family law issues "the rule of decision shall be the Muslim Personal 
Law (Shariat) where the parties are Muslim." The parallel law applicable in Pakistan, the 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (Act XXVI of 1937), was weak and 
Ineffective and aggravated the problem of what law applied under the Guardians & 
Wards Act. The judiciary resolved the questions in 1964 by reviving a dormant legal 
technique. The events of nine years prior to that important development enabled the 
courts to open a door to ijtihad which had long been closed. ~3 
A. Ijtihiid before 1964 
The right of individual reasoning, i.e. ijtihad, was disfavored from A.D.900. 24 It was 
superseded by the duty oftaqlld, or adherence to established law. Though the doctrine of 
taqlld was "not unchallenged in theory, in practice [it] had been consistently observed"25 
to the time when the Pakistani Commission on Marriage and Family Law was set up in 
1955. 
The Commission consisted of three laymen, three laywomen, and one representative 
of the 'ulama. 26 The group was created to review existing legislation and formulate the 
changes necessary "in order to give women their proper place in society according to the 
21 The Guardians & Wards Act of 1890, § 17(~?), (3). 
22 A parent may, for example, leave the countr:, and forfeit custodial rights. See Khizar Hayat 
Khan Tiwana v. Zainab Begum, P.L.D. (S.C.) Lah. 402 (1967). 
23 See Bonderman, supra note 4, at 1174-75. 
24 Coulson,Islamic Family Law: Progress in Pakistan, in CHANGING LAW IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
240, 242 (1963). 
25 /d. 
26 "'Ulama" (singular=alim) are Islamic religious specialists or "guardians of the law." They are 
expected to be competent in leading prayer and sermonizing. Nagata, Islamic Revival and the Problem 
of Legitimacy Among Rural Religious Elites in Malaysia, 17 MAN 42-57 (1982). 
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fundamentals of Islam."27 The results appeared in 1956 in a report recommending 
reforms in marriage, divorce, and family maintenance law. In Coulson's words, advocacy 
by the Pakistani Commission of "a sudden and total break with past tradition by the 
reopening of the door of ijtihad as the foundation for comprehensive reform naturally 
shocked the conservative element into violent reaction."28 The controversy continued 
until and beyond approval of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961.29 
The 1961 statute is a watered-down version of the original report - a compromise 
between the dramatic reforms proposed by the Commission and the practices advocated 
by conservative Muslims. The Act requires that marriages be registered and that arbitra-
tion councils be set up to deal with family law disputes. It limits polygamy to those 
instances where an arbitration council gives written permission and requires notice of a 
talaq divorce3o after it has been pronounced. The most far-reaching reforms are those 
touching polygamy and altering the structure of succession. 31 
B. Effect on Custody Decisions 
Though custody was not within the Commission's purview, the Commission's partial 
success encouraged the judiciary to test the waters of reform. In 1964, the High Court of 
Lahore ruled that "if there is no clear rule of decision in Qur'anic and Traditional Text 
... a Court may resort to private reasoning and, in that, will undoubtedly be guided by 
the rules of justice, equity, and good conscience."32 The decision was followed in the 
custody case of Zohra Begum v. Latif Ahmad Munawwar33 in 1965. 
The Zohra dispute arose over custody of two children, a son age seven and a daughter 
below the age of puberty. The mother took the children from the father in 1953. In 1961, 
the parties obtained a divorce. The father then brought an action for custody under 
section 25 of the Guardians & Wards Act. The lower court applied the principle that "the 
rule of Personal Law proceeds on the welfare of the minors and the welfare of the minor 
does not mean that appointment shall be inconsistent with the rule of Personal Law."34 
Therefore, custody of the seven year-old boy belonged to the father, while the girl would 
remain with the mother until she reached puberty. The father's objection that the mother 
was unfit to serve as guardian failed. 
On appeal, the High Court reconsidered the question of what law should determine 
the outcome of the dispute. Section 25 ties a custody award to the minor's welfare. Section 
17, on the other hand, required a decision inconsistent with "the law to which the minor is 
subject." A literal reading of these provisions might lead to disparate results in similar 
27 Esposito, supra note 1, at 224. See also J. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW (1982) 
[hereinafter cited as ESPOSITO, WOMEN]; CHANGES IN MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW, A SYMPOSIUM (1964). 
28 Coulson, supra note 24, at 247. 
29 See ESPOSITO, WOMEN, supra note 27, at 100 (discussing the Pakistani government's reconsid-
eration of the Muslim Family Ordinance Provisions concerning notice of divorce, reconciliation, and 
inheritance). 
30 "Talaq" divorce means, literally, "repudiation." ESPOSITO, WOMEN, supra note 27, at 29-30. 
Talaq comes from the root "tallaqa" meaning to release a human being from any obligation 
incumbent upon him. It signifies one spouse's release of the other spouse from the marriage bond, 
whether by repudiation or legal process. Id. In Hanafi law, there are five grades of talaq. 
31 See Abbot, Pakistan's New Marriage Law, 1 ASIA.)! SURVEY 26 (1962). Much of the controversy 
surrounding the 1956 Report stemmed from the alleged exercise of ijtihad by untrained laypersons. 
32 Khurshid Jan v. Fazal Dad, 2 P.L.D. (W.P.) Lah. 558, 562 (1964). 
33 2 P.L.D. (H.C.) Lah. 695 (1965). 
34 Id. at 699. 
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cases. The High Court resolved the question by interpreting Hanafi law itself as an 
application of the welfare principle: 
[A]II rules of Muhammadan law relating to the guardianship and custody of 
the minor are merely application of the principles of benefit of the minor to 
diverse circumstances. Welfare of the minor remains the dominent [sic] con-
sideration and the rules only try to give effect to what is [the] minor's welfare 
from the Muslim point of view.35 
The court then considered whether the children's welfare in Zohra coincided with the 
traditional Hanafi provisions. Conflicting views in textbooks as to custodial provisions 
were examined by the presiding judge. The court concluded that there were no clear 
provisions of applicable Muslim law, circumventing the embarassment of a direct conflict 
between a child's welfare and "the law to which the minor is subject." Instead the court 
ruled that 
Where there is no Qur'anic or Traditional Text or an Ijma on a point of law, 
and if there be a difference of views between A'imma and Faqihs, a Court may 
form its own opinion on a point of law .... Courts which have taken the place 
of Qazis can, therefore, come to their own conclusions by process of Ijtihiid . ... 
[I]t would be permissible for the courts to depart from the rule stated therein 
if, on the facts of a given case, its application is against the welfare of the 
minors.36 
On the merits, the court decided that both minors should remain in their mother's 
custody. 
The Zohra decision establishes a two-step analysis in custody cases. First, in principle, 
welfare overrides other considerations when determining custody. Secondly, ijtihad may 
be exercised to determine where the welfare of the minor lies. 
Prior to Zohra, Muslim personal law took a different direction. In the custody case of 
Muhammad Bashir v. Ghulam Fatima ,37 for example, the court quoted Tyabji's Muhammadan 
Law: 
[I]t is not for the Courts to say that it is against the minor's welfare that 
custody should be taken away from the person (if any such there be) who is by 
law entitled to the custody, as of right; since, when the law lays down that the 
custody shall be with a specified person, the law presumes (to adopt Col-
eridge, J.'s words) that where the legal custody is, there ... is the greatest 
welfare of the minor to be placed. The Court is bound by the provision of the 
law in forming its opinion as to whose custody is most for the welfare of the 
minor.38 
In cases following Zohra, the child's welfare gained the determinative role. Takera Begum 
v. Saleem Ahmed Siddiqui 39 found that the mother should have custody of her daughter 
until the latter attained puberty "subject, however, to [her daughter's] welfare."4o Backing 
35 [d. at 700 (quoting Bakhsh v. Ghulam Fatima, P.L.D. Pesh. 26 (1958». 
36 [d. at 695. 
37 P.L.D. (H.C.) Lah. 73 (1953). 
38 [d. at 80. 
3. P.L.D. (H.C.) Karachi 619 (1970). 
40 [d. at 620. 
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away, the 1974 case of Anwar Mirza v. Qamar Sultana 4! required that the father's right to 
custody be honored unless "weighty considerations" dictated another arrangement. In 
Juma Khan v. Gul Ferosha,42 however, the High Court seemed to reject these presumptions, 
stating that "[i]n deciding the question of the custody of a minor the welfare of the minor 
alone is to be considered."43 
In applying the first part of the test, courts have waivered between recognizing a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of the parent who would have rightful custody under 
Hanafi law and assessing welfare without recourse to a presumption. The split between 
the courts which recognize a presumption in favor of the Hanafi guardian and those 
which do not is illustrated by two 1978 cases. In Feroze Begum v. Muhammad Hussain,44 the 
Supreme Court applied the principle that "the overriding and paramount consideration 
always is the welfare of the minor. Indeed this is the consideration that must prevail in the 
final analysis and the fact that the father is the lawful guardian of his minor children does 
not compel the Court to pass an order in his favour unless it is in their welfare to do SO."45 
The High Court in Ghulam Sakina v. Ghulam Abbas, 46 on the other hand, reiterated the rule 
of Zohra that the Muslim law was based on the minor's welfare and concluded that "when 
personal law gives the custody of the minor to the mother, it is presumed that the welfare 
of the minor is with the mother unless the facts leading to the contrary inference are 
proved."47 Feroze caps the line of cases which hold welfare to be the sole consideration, to 
be evaluated anew with each decision. Ghulam follows those cases which take Muslim law 
to establish a presumption in favor of one party which may then be refuted by arguments 
that the minor's welfare lies elsewhere. 
This distinction has no practical significance; in either line of cases welfare is a 
subjective standard leading to the result which the court deems preferable. Both lines of 
decisions acknowledge a wide variety of factors contributing to a minor's welfare: that a 
daughter is happy with her mother;48 that her father has not paid a penny toward the 
minor's maintenance;49 that the father's remarriage makes his custody unacceptable;50 
that children should stay in their established school.5! Other factors have been ignored by 
the courts. In Zohra itself, the mother admitted that she had suffered psychiatric problems 
in the past as a result of her husband's ill-treatment, but the court felt that her past 
problems should not be considered in assessing the children's welfare. 52 Similarly, in 
Ghulam Sakina, that the mother was illiterate and unable to maintain the children was not 
considered. Her illiteracy had apparently not affected their education, and the mainte-
nance was the father's responsibility.53 In Tahera Begum, the parent's private agreement 
41 P.L.D. (Note 90) Karachi 139 (1974). 
42 P.L.D. (H.C.) Pesh. 1 (1972). 
43 /d. at 2. 
44 XI S.C.M.R. 299 (1978). 
45 [d. at 302. 
46 P.L.D. (H.C.) Lah. 1389 (1978). 
47 /d. at 1392. 
48 Bharai v. Wazir Muhammad, P.L.D. (H. C.) Lah. 333 (1967). 
49 [d: 
50 [d.; Feroze, S.C.M.R. 299 (1978); Fahmida Begum v. Habib Ahmad, P.L.D. (H.C.) Lah. 112 
( 1968). 
51 Feroze, S.C.M.R. 299, 302 (1978). 
52 Zohra, 2 P.L.D. Lah. 695, 698 (1965). 
53 P.L.D. Lah. 1389, 1391 (1978). 
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with regard to custody was given no weight by the court.54 None of ~hese decisions 
mention the desirability of keeping siblings together in the same home. 
The most notable oversight seems to be failure to consider the mother's remarriage 
to a stranger,55 a rule with an identifiable basis in the Qur'an. According to Muhammad 
Bashir, "[t]he original saying of the Holy Prophet, on which this rule is based, is that a 
woman loses her right when she marries a stranger."56 
Courts have not, however, ignored the problem. In the Bashir case, for example, the 
mother's remarriage created a strong presumption in favor of the father which was not 
overcome. The High Court again examined the remarriage issue in the 1963 case of 
Nazeer Begum v. Abdul Sattar,57 holding that, though "there can be no two opinions about 
this [Qur'anic] proposition of law," the mother simply lost her place in the hierarchy of 
preferred custodial arrangements. If it nevertheless appeared that she was "of all persons 
entitled to the custody of her infant children," she might retain custody despite her 
remarriage. 58 The reasoning was extended in Rahela Khatun v. Ramela Khatun, 59 where the 
mother was awarded custody despite her marriage to a stranger and despite the applica-
tions of a paternal aunt and uncle. 
These remarriage cases are another example of ijtihad, clearer perhaps than Zohra 
since the reasoning is required to fill a gap between the Qur'anic text and the case at hand. 
But like Zohra and its progeny, the controlling standard which emerges is the welfare of 
the child. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Thejuxtaposition of British law and Pakistani-Muslim law after years of cohabitation 
is central to the ijtihad debate.60 In his work on Pakistani law reform, Coulson asserts that 
it is virtually impossible to exercise ijtihad in the context of Anglo-Muhammadan law. He 
suggests that, of the domestic law reforms proposed by the Pakistani Commission, only 
the penalty assessed for failure to register marriages is genuine ijtihad. Unlike the other 
reforms, it directly reflects a Qur'anic principle: the requirement that contracts be in 
writing. Reform by amendment, he adds, is "more practical and probably far better suited 
to the present mood and aspirations of Pakistan,"61 but it is not ijtihad. 
Coulson's intimations reflect a problem of definition rather than substance. First, the 
product of ijtihad need not be a unique solution. Pakistan's 'welfare' test is virtually 
identical to the 'best interests of the child' standard of British law. The Guardians & 
Wards Act of 1890 does not, however, set out an unambiguous statement of the test, nor 
did British law clearly formulate the standard in 1890 when the Act was passed. Isolated 
in its Pakistani context, the welfare principle is in the nature of ijtihad. It follows from the 
landmark decision in Khurshid Jan v. Fazal Dad,62 which authorizes private reasoning 
54 P.L.D. Karachi 619, 620 (1970). 
55. A mother who divorces and marries a second husband who is not related to the minor by 
blood or marriage loses her preferential right to custody. F. TYABJI, supra note 19, at § 257 (4th ed. 
1968); A. FYZEE, supra note 2, at 100-01. 
56 P.L.D. Lah. 73, 77 (1953). 
57 P.L.D. (W.P.) Karachi 465 (1963). 
58 [d. at 466. 
59 P.L.D. (H.C.) Dacca 24 (1971). 
60 Coulson, supra note 24, at 255-57. 
61 [d. at 257. See also ESPOSITO, WOMEN, supra note 27, at 86. 
62 P.L.D. Lah. 558 (1964). 
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"guided by the rules of justice, equity and good conscience or, in terms of Fiqah, by the 
doctrines of Istihsan and Istislah."63 That the best interests test appears in British law as 
well does not detract from its appropriateness ih Pakistan. It is not an attribute of ijtihad 
that a just solution must be rejected because a similar solution has been implemented 
elsewhere. 
Secondly, the process through which the judiciary arrived at the welfare test con-
forms to the requirements of ijtihad. In each of the cases discussed above, distinguished 
jurists examined existing law and identified conflicting, irreconcilable principles which 
could only be resolved through independent reasoning. In the remarriage cases, the 
reasoning filled a gap between the Qur'anic principles and the facts of a particular case. 
Other custody cases were decided in the face of disparate teachings from the various 
schools of Islamic law. In none of these cases do jurists begin with independent reasoning, 
nor do they advocate recourse to ijtihad by those other than legal specialists. 
Zohra and its progeny have been called the "new ijtihad,"64 but their newness is less 
apparent than is their organic relation with the old ijtihad. Anglo-Muhammadan law is 
not static. Just as the British influence peaked in the 19th century, so has it waned in the 
20th. When faced with a concerted Islamic resurgence and deliberate exercise of Muslim 
jurisprudence by qualified jurists, the legal system has rebounded from Anglo-
Muhammadism and toward the Islamic ideal. These recent cases do not depart from the 
long march of Islam, but enable courts to reinforce the Muslim point of view in situations 
where Islamic law must be dynamic to preserve the fundamental principles of Islamic 
society. 
63 [d. at 599. 
B< N. COULSoN,supra note 1, at 202-17 (discussing neo-ijtihad); ESPOSITO, WOMEN, supra note 27, 
at 99. See also F. Rahman, supra note 5, at 326. 
